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T EXAS now has some seventy administrative agencies performing im-
portant legislative, executive, and judicial functions.' A govern-
mental body which may investigate, make rules, adjudicate, and enforce
the law has great potential for arbitrary, capricious, and discriminatory
action.2 It is my contention that after all these years we still lack effective
judicial review of administrative decisions.
Three primary objectives of judicial review of administrative action
have been stated: (1) to assure that the agency has acted within its stat-
utory authority;5 (2) to determine whether the proceedings of the agency
met the requirements of due process;4 and (3) to determine whether the
agency acted arbitrarily, capriciously, and without regard to the evidence.'
It is submitted that under the established pattern of judicial review, the
Texas courts have been inattentive to the second objective and actually
have prevented the third.
The usual Texas judicial inquiry is whether substantial evidence sup-
ports the administrative action, but no mind is paid to the evidence that
was before the agency. A new proceeding is conducted in court, and the
substantiality of the evidence introduced in the new proceeding is exam-
ined. This is the object of my dissatisfaction, and I shall refer to it as sub-
stantial evidence de novo review.
I. DEVELOPMENT OF SUBSTANTIAL EVIDENCE DE Novo REVIEW
Substantial evidence de novo review had its inception in Shupee v. Rail-
road Commission.' The Railroad Commission had denied Shupee's appli-
cation for a certificate of authority to operate a bus line. Shupee appealed
the denial, alleging in the district court' that the Commission's order was
* B.A., University of Texas; LL.B., Harvard University. Associate Justice, Supreme Court of
Texas. Assisted by Peter M. Lowry, B.A., LL.B., University of Texas.
STEXAS ALMANAC 615 (1968-69).
For an excellent discussion of the potential danger presented by combination of powers within
a single governmental unit, see Walker, The Application of the Substantial Evidence Rule in Appeals
From Orders of the Railroad Commission, 32 TEXAs L. REv. 639 (1954).
'Brown v. Humble Oil & Ref. Co., 126 Tex. 296, 87 S.W.2d 1069 (1935); Bradley v. Texas
Liquor Control Bd., 108 S.W.2d 300 (Tex. Civ. App. 1937).4 Miller v. Railroad Comm'n, 363 S.W.2d 244 (Tex. 1962); Railroad Comm'n v. Alamo Ex-
press, 158 Tex. 68, 308 S.W.2d 843 (1958); Francisco v. Board of Dental Examiners, 149 S.W.2d
619 (Tex. Civ. App. 1941), error ref.
'Alamo Express v. Union City Transfer, 158 Tex. 234, 309 S.W.2d 815 (1958); Railroad
Comm'n v. Shell Oil Co., 139 Tex. 66, 161 S.W.2d 1022 (1942); Shupee v. Railroad Comm'n,
123 Tex. 521, 73 S.W.2d 505 (1934).
SShupee v. Railroad Comm'n, 57 S.W.2d 295 (Tex. Civ. App. 1933), aff'd, 123 Tex. 521, 73
S.W.2d 505 (1934).
'Appeal was pursuant to Tsx. Rsv. CirV. STAT. ANN. art. 911a, S 17 (1964) which provides
that:
If any . . . [party at interest] be dissatisfied with any decision, rate, charge, rule,
order, act, or regulation adopted by the Commission, such dissatisfied . . . (party
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unjust because not supported by the facts in evidence before the Com-
mission. The district court, without a jury, set aside the order denying
the certificate as "unjust and unreasonable" and enjoined the Commission
from interfering with operation of the bus line over the designated route.
The court of civil appeals reversed the order of the trial court and dis-
solved the injunction Shupee contended in the supreme court that the
trial court should substitute its own finding based upon the preponderance
of the evidence adduced on the trial de novo for that of the Commission.
In affirming the court of civil appeals, the supreme court said:
We think it clear that the intention of the statutory provisions is that the
decisions of the Railroad Commission upon the granting or refusing of any
permit to operate a bus line over any highways in Texas should be final and
conclusive, unless it acted unreasonably and unlawfully, or unless its decisions
had no basis in fact and were arbitrary or capricious. In other words, if the
findings and orders of the Railroad Commission in such matters had any
reasonable basis in fact, and were not shown to be arbitrary and unreason-
able, they must be supported by the court. The court cannot substitute itsjudgment for that of the commission, unless it be shown that said judgment
of the commission was without foundation in fact, or was unreasonable or
arbitrary.9
Three cases"0 involving orders of the Oil and Gas Division of the Rail-
road Commission intervened between Shupee and 1946, at which time
substantial evidence de novo review was finalized by the supreme court in
Trapp v. Shell Oil Co." Trapp had been given a rule 37 permit to drill a
second oil well on a small tract in the East Texas field. The question was
one of confiscation and turned on the amount of acreage to be considered
in determining Trapp's right to a second well. Chief Justice Alexander
believed that such a question of property right should be determined
independently by the court, though the burden of proof would be on the
party appealing, as provided in the statute."2 But the other members of
the court concluded that Railroad Commission decisions would be upheld
so long as the prevailing party could produce substantial evidence in sup-
port thereof. Furthermore, it was decided that examination would be
made of the evidence presented to the trial court, rather than the evidence
presented to the administrative agency, to determine whether the required
support existed. It is submitted that the decision in Trapp served neither
at interest] may file a petition setting forth the particular objection to such decision,
rate, charge, rule, order, act, or regulation, or to either or all of them in the district
court in Travis County, Texas, against said Commission as defendant. Said action
. . . shall be tried and determined as other civil causes in a said court . . . . In
all trials under this section the burden of proof shall rest upon the plaintiff who
must show by the preponderance of evidence that the decisions . . . complained of
are unreasonable and unjust to it or them.
8Shupee v. Railroad Comm'n, 57 S.W.2d 295 (1933).
9 123 Tex. at 527, 73 S.W.2d at 508.
" 0Marrs v. Railroad Comm'n, 142 Tex. 293, 177 S.W.2d 941 (1944); Railroad Comm'n v.
Shell Oil Co., 139 Tex. 66, 161 S.W.2d 1022 (1942); Gulf Land Co. v. Atlantic Ref. Co., 134
Tex. 59, 131 S.W.2d 73 (1939). For discussion of these cases and their confusing holdings, see
Griffin, The Growing Substantial Evidence Rule, 21 TEX. B.J. 721 (1958); Larson, The Substantial
Evidence Rule: Texas Version, 5 Sw. L.J. 1S2 (1951); Walker, The Application of the Substantial
Evidence Rule in Appeals from Orders of the Railroad Commission, 32 TEXAs L. Ruv. 639 (1954).
i 145 Tex. 323, 198 S.W.2d 424 (1946).
"Dissenting opinion, id. at 335, 198 S.W.2d at 442.
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the objectives of the Trapp majority nor those of Chief Justice Alexander.
To uphold the agency's findings, if supported by substantial evidence, is
a large concession; to look only at the trial court record concedes much
more. In formulating this rule in Trapp, the court adopted Chief Justice
Alexander's reasoning in a former case to the effect that it would be for-
eign to the law of Texas to bind a court to evidence and findings of fact
adduced by an administrative agency unfamiliar with the principles of ad-
missibility of testimony and the weight to be given thereto. 3
II. OPERATION OF SUBSTANTIAL EVIDENCE DE Novo REVIEW
As indicated above, one aspect of the rule set down in Trapp appar-
ently resulted from a judicial lack of confidence in agency fact determi-
nation. But since the question on appeal becomes one of law, the court is
allowed to make no fact finding at all. The order is presumed to be valid
and reasonably supported by substantial evidence, and the burden is on
the party complaining to show that the order was not reasonably sup-
ported" by facts existing at the time of the entry of the order. Under this
form of the substantial evidence rule, the agency action itself is not being
reviewed. In fact, the record compiled before the agency is usually not
even admissible before the trial court."4
Unless the particular review statute requires otherwise, the adminis-
trative agency need give no reason for its action. The court will presume
a proper finding and a sufficient reason so long as there is substantial evi-
dence to support the presumed basis of the agency's decision." However,
if the agency gives its reason by finding a certain fact and is silent as to
any other reason, the order cannot be upheld on the basis of a finding
w hich was not made.'6 To circumvent this rule, the agencies have become
even less specific about the reasons for their orders. For example, when it
was decided in Gulf Land Co. v. Atlantic Refining Co." that a Railroad
Commission order could not be upheld on the ground of waste prevention
when the order gave as its reason the prevention of confiscation, the
Commission thereafter simply put into its printed order that its action
was to "prevent waste and/or confiscation."'"
A party appealing an administrative decision may have a difficult bur-
den, for "substantial evidence" need not be much evidence. Though "sub-
stantial" means more than a mere scintilla or some evidence," it is cer-
tald. at 330, 198 S.W.2d at 429-30.
14 Whether evidence heard by the agency is admissible at the trial on appeal must depend upon
its own merits under the rules of evidence, and without regard as to whether it was introduced at
the hearing. Railroad Comm'n v. Shell Oil Co., 139 Tex. 66, 80, 161 S.W.2d 1022, 1030 (1942);
Magnolia Petroleum Co. v. New Process Prod. Co., 129 Tex. 617, 104 S.W.2d 1106 (1937).
"aRailroad Comm'n v. Magnolia Petroleum Co., 130 Tex. 484, 109 S.W.2d 967 (1937).
"oCity of San Antonio v. Texas Water Comm'n, 407 S.W.2d 752 (Tex. 1966). As to implied
findings, see Gibraltar Say. & Loan Ass'n v. Falkner, 371 S.W.2d 548 (Tex. 1963); Gulf Land Co.
v. Atlantic Ref. Co., 134 Tex. 59, 131 S.W.2d 73 (1939).
7134 Tex. 59, 131 S.W.2d 73 (1939).
"8 Comment, Findings and Decisions by Administrative Agencies, 33 TEXAs L. REV. 650, 658
(1955).
"' Trapp v. Shell Oil Co., 145 Tex. 323, 198 S.W.2d 424 (1946); Board of Firemen's Relief
& Retirement Fund Trustees v. Marks, 150 Tex. 433, 242 S.W.2d 181 (1931); Comment, Some
Aspects of the Texas "Substantial Evidence" Rule, 33 TEXAs L. REv. 717, 723 (1955).
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tainly less than is required to sustain a verdict being attacked as against
the great weight and preponderance of the evidence. In Trapp the court
quoted Trem Carr v. Shell Oil Co." as follows: "If the evidence as a
whole is such that reasonable minds could not have reached the conclu-
sion that the agency must have reached in order to justify its action, then
the order must be set aside.""
The primary difference between the federal form of substantial evi-
dence review and Texas substantial evidence de novo review is that the
federal courts confine their search for substantial evidence to the record
made at the administrative hearing."' The amount of evidence considered
substantial appears to be the same. In Consolidated Edison Co. v. NLRB'
the Supreme Court of the United States observed that "[s]ubstantial evi-
dence is more than a scintilla. It means such relevant evidence as a reason-
able mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.""' In NLRB
v. Columbia Enameling & Stamping Co.' the Court said that substantial
evidence means, "evidence which is substantial, that is, affording a sub-
stantial basis of fact from which the fact in question can be reasonably
inferred .... It must be enough to justify, if the trial were to a jury, a re-
fusal to direct a verdict when the conclusion sought to be drawn from
it is one of fact for the jury . .. ."
The typical appeal from a Texas administrative agency consists of a
lengthy trial with a large accumulation of elaborate exhibits and much
expert testimony. After considering all of this evidence, the trial court
is supposed to approve the act of the agency if substantial evidence be-
fore the court reasonably supports what the agency did. But what is the
connection between the two proceedings? The trial court has no way of
knowing why the agency acted or even what evidence it considered. Much
of the evidence introduced in the trial court was not even compiled, and
certainly not considered, at the time of the agency hearing."7 What does
substantial evidence before the trial court indicate as to the wisdom or
reason of the agency's decision? There is a judicial hearing, but it is not
review.
As a matter of common practice an applicant's theory and evidence
change between the time of the agency hearing and the court trial. If we
are correct in assuming that the agency has an expertise in such matters,
why should it not have the benefit of the voluminous evidence that sees
the light of day only in the courthouse? And what kind of game is it
rhnt ;ustif;es an order, or warrants a presumption to support its finding, in
20139 Tex. 66, 161 S.W.2d 1022 (1942).
21 145 Tex. at 349-50, 198 S.W.2d at 441.
224 K. DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE § 29.02 (1958); Walker, supra note 10, at 642.
2a305 U.S. 197 (1938).
141(. at 229.
25 306 U.S. 292 (1939).
28 Id. at 299-300.
"7 To be admissible in the trial court on appeal, evidence must pertain to conditions as they
existed at the time of the administrative order. Cook Drilling Co. v. Gulf Oil Corp., 139 Tex. 80,
161 S.W.2d 1035 (1942); Railroad Comm'n v. Magnolia Petroleum Co., 130 Tex. 484, 109
S.W.2d 967 (1937); Magnolia Petroleum Co. v. New Process Prod. Co., 129 Tex. 617, 104
S.W.2d 1106 (1937). The evidence itself need not have been adduced nor discovered at the time
of the order. Pickens v. Railroad Comm'n, 387 S.W.2d 35 (Tex. 1965).
[Vol. 23
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a mountain of evidence that could not have been considered because it did
not exist at the time the order in question was issued?
I submit that the doctor cannot diagnose me by examining you, and
that we cannot determine the nature of the surface of Mars by studying
the moon. If we are to review the procedure and the decision of the
agency, we should review what it did, what it considered, and the reasons
it gave for its decision. Then there would be a basis for determining the
fairness of the decision and whether the reasons the agency gave for its
action were reasonably supported by the facts which were before it.
The case of Alamo Express, Inc. v. Railroad Commission"s is a typical
example of substantial evidence de novo review in operation. Missouri
Pacific Truck Lines applied for a permit to use an alternate route, direct
between Houston and San Antonio, rather than a route that paralleled its
rail line by way of Victoria. The hearing before the Commission exam-
iner, in March of 1963, elicited the limited advice of eight witnesses.
Those witnesses established the obvious point that to give Missouri Pacific
a direct route from Houston to San Antonio would improve its competi-
tive advantage, but otherwise the witnesses were satisfied with matters
and made very few complaints about existing service. Nevertheless, the
Commission granted the permit. Seven competing motor carriers appealed
the grant.
In May of 1965, two years and two months later, the case came on for
trial in Travis County district court where testimony was presented for a
month. An expert described in great detail the economic development of
the affected area. Ninety witnesses, either shippers or receivers, testified.
From this testimony it appeared that dissatisfaction did exist with the
services. Thus, the supreme court found that the grant of the certificate
was reasonably supported by substantial evidence of inadequacy of exist-
ing services.
I make no objection to the outcome of this case, but I wonder if the
reason for the Commission's order had any relation to the inquiry to
which the trial court devoted a month of its time. There was no justifica-
tion visible to the judiciary for presuming that the agency had brought
to bear some vast knowledge, or had done its job well, or had made a
sound fact determination.
III. DUE PROCESS IN AGENCY PROCEEDINGS
I submit that it is poor process for the court to hear the evidence after
the agency has already decided the facts. If the agency is to do the decid-
ing it should hear the evidence. And if the court is to review the agency's
verdict the only evidence which it should review is that which the agency
considered. This must be our focus if the objective is to detect a denial
of due process or to detect a decision made without regard to the evi-
dence.
The basic elements of due process at the agency level are notice, hear-
28407 S.W.2d 479 (Tex. 1966).
1969]
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ing, and an impartial trier of facts." Notice and hearing are not required
unless the particular agency exercises powers which may deprive a person
of liberty or property. In cases of license revocation, for example, the
question is whether the licensed activity is considered a right or a privi-
lege; if it is only the latter, license revocation may be accomplished with-
out notice or hearing." If an activity may be prohibited under the police
power it is merely a privilege.' In House of Tobacco v. Calvert" the Texas
supreme court extended the benefits of notice and hearing to holders of
cigarette license permits by refusing to classify the interest as a privilege.
Another recent case indicating the court's increasing concern that notice
and hearing be provided is City of Houston v. Fore."3 In that case the city
made improvements to the street upon which defendant's property abut-
ted. Notice of the hearing at which the improvements were authorized was
published three times in the Houston Press pursuant to a city ordinance.
Defendant did not read the notice and failed to attend the hearing. The
record showed that defendant's address was known to the city. The court
held that notice by publication was insufficient under the due process
clause of the fourteenth amendment to the United States Constitution be-
cause such notice was not reasonably calculated to apprise interested par-
ties of the pendency of the action.
The Texas courts, though requiring notice and hearing, have not been
overly concerned with the procedure followed at the hearing itself. This
is because the hearing has been rendered of secondary importance by sub-
stantial evidence de novo review. In Texas, administrative agencies have
no established rules of evidence and do not follow the rules of evidence
that govern judicial procedure?"
Due process does not require that the hearing conform to judicial pro-
cess. ' However, in Warren Independent School District v. Southern Neches
Corp.,as a court of civil appeals held that a protesting taxpayer was de-
prived of due process in a hearing before the Board of Equalization be-
cause he was denied the right to cross-examine witnesses. The court rea-
soned that cross examination was necessary to allow the protesting tax-
payer a reasonable opportunity to develop the facts upon which its pro-
test was based." The supreme court refused the application for writ of
29In re Oliver, 333 U.S. 257, 273 (1948). R. PARKER, ADMINISTRATIVE LAw 42 (1952).
s. House of Tobacco, Inc. v. Calvert, 394 S.W.2d 654 (Tex. 1965); Davis, The Requirement of
a Trial-Type Hearing, 70 HARV. L. REv. 193, 267 (1956).
"' The theory behind this distinction is that since the activity may be prohibited, a license to
engage in it may be withdrawn whenever the state so desires. This reasoning has been criticized as
illogical. Note, Administrative Procedure-Due Process Requires that the Holder of a Cigarette
Permit Be Given Notice and a Hearing Prior to Forfeiture of the Permit, 44 TExAs L. REv. 1360
(1966), and authorities there cited.
3'394 S.W.2d 654 (Tex. 1965).
3'412 S.W.2d 35 (Tex. 1967).
3 Winters, Administrative Practice in Texas, 26 TEX. B.J. 925 (1963). For an excellent view
of an agency's procedures, see Greenhill & McGinnis, Practice &5 Procedure in Oil and Gas Hearings
in Texas, 18 Sw. L.J. 406 (1964).
'FCC v. WJR, The Goodwill Station, 337 U.S. 265, 275-76 (1949); Reetz v. Michigan, 188
U.S. 505, 507 (1903).
38405 S.W.2d 100 (Tex. Civ. App. 1965), error ref. n.r.e.
"Id. at 104-05.
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error, n.r.e., but held in a per curiam opinion" that there was no denial
of due process. However, the approach of the court of civil appeals may
yet see its day.
One area of questionable due process is the practice of taking official
notice of administrative records not introduced into evidence during the
hearing." The United States Supreme Court has often held that due pro-
cess is violated when evidence is treated as such without being introduced.
In United States v. Abilene & Southern Railway" a finding of the Interstate
Commerce Commission rested, in part, upon data taken from annual re-
ports filed with the Commission and not introduced into evidence. The
Supreme Court held that the reports could not support a finding since the
carriers had no notice that they were being confronted by such evidence
until after the finding."' In Ohio Bell Telephone Co. v. Public Utilities
Conmission" the Court held that "fundamentals of a trial were denied"
by the Ohio Utilities Commission because the commission considered cer-
tain price trends that were not in the administrative record. The Court
said it was "as if a judge were to tell us, 'I looked at the statistics in the
Library of Congress, and they teach me thus and so.' This will never do
if hearings and appeals are to be more than empty forms."'
United States Supreme Court cases notwithstanding, the Texas supreme
court long has held that agencies may consider extra-record data." In
Phillips v. Brazosport Savings & Loan Ass'n" the court was concerned
with the validity of an order of the Banking Commissioner granting a
charter and certificate of authority to American Savings & Loan Associa-
tion. Brazosport Savings & Loan Association attacked the order in the
district court and that court rendered judgment upholding the order of
the Commissioner. The court of civil appeals reversed on grounds of pro-
cedural irregularity, one of which was reliance by the Commissioner on an
investigator's report not introduced at the administrative hearing. The
supreme court reversed the court of civil appeals and affirmed the judg-
ment of the trial court. In holding that consideration of the investigator's
report did not constitute denial of due process, the court distinguished
out-of-state cases on the basis that they were decided under statutes that
expressly limited judicial review to the record made at the hearing." The
United States Supreme Court denied a writ of certiorari in Brazosport,
indicating perhaps that minimal requirements of due process were met.
"404 S.W.2d 809 (Tex. 1966).
39See Annot., 99 L. Ed. 460 (1955); Annot., 18 A.L.R.2d 552 (1951); 2 K. DAVES, supra
note 22, §§ 15.01-.14.
40265 U.S. 274 (1924).
41 Id. at 289.
4301 U.S. 292 (1937).
' Id. at 303.
"See, e.g., Alamo Express, Inc. v. Union City Transfer, 158 Tex. 234, 309 S.W.2d 815 (1958).
45366 S.W.2d 929 (Tex. 1963).
41 Id. at 935: "In any event, we think that respondents have not been deprived of their pro-
cedural rights in this case. It has repeatedly been held by the Texas decisions that the Commissioner
is not confined to the evidence actually brought out at the hearing, but may rely upon information
disclosed by the office records."
1969]
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IV. INATTENTION TO THE ADMINISTRATIVE HEARING
The ultimate test of due process of law in any administrative hearing
is the presence or absence of "the rudiments of fair play long known to
our law.'" Though minimal constitutional requirements may be met by
Texas administrative agencies, fair play cannot be assured under the pres-
ent system. Both parties often hold back the bulk of their evidence for
the trial court, leaving the agency with little data upon which to base a
reasoned decision. In such cases the decision may be affirmed on a showing
of substantial evidence despite the errors in the proceedings of the agency.
In Southwestern Greyhound Lines v. Railroad Commission" petitioners
attacked an order of the Railroad Commission granting All American
Bus Lines a certificate of convenience and necessity to operate a motor
carrier service. The Commission's order, in stating that the existing car-
riers did not "conclusively establish" their ability to immediately remedy
the existing inadequate service, erroneously placed the burden of proof
upon them. In holding that the order should be affirmed, the court of
civil appeals said:
It has been stated many times by our courts that the Commission is an
expert, technical body which devotes its time and talents to the administration
of some of our largest and most complex businesses. While it is a quasi-
judicial body, it is not a court; its members need not be attorneys. Its actions,
proceedings and orders are not subject to the same critical scrutiny as would
be accorded those of a court .... Viewed most favorably for appellants, the
use of the word conclusively in that portion of the order of the Commission
under consideration, merely reflects an erroneous reason for the Commission's
finding that appellant was unable immediately to render adequate service, as
well, perhaps, as an erroneous reason for granting the certificate to appellee.
The courts are not bound by the stated reasons of the Commissioner in making
an order. The order is to be upheld if it has a valid basis. The valid basis here
is substantial evidence to show public convenience and necessity as found by
the Commission. We are most unwilling to make any departure from this
rule which was established only after long and tedious judicial travail."
Perhaps the burden was misplaced, and perhaps the matter was inconse-
quential. The point is that the court cannot know without looking at the
record before the Commission. So why the proud fixation with "long and
tedious judicial travail"?
The primary fault of substantial evidence de novo review is that it
renders the agency proceeding of virtually no importance. The courts
apparently believe that defects in the administrative hearing may be cured
upon appeal. In Cook Drilling Co. v. Gulf Oil Corp.'M the validity of an
order of the Railroad Commission was in question. The court said:
Since there is to be a full hearing of the facts in the district court, whether
the Commission actually heard sufficient evidence to sustain the order is not
material. As is well known, hearings before the Commission are informal.
In the vast majority of instances its orders are not contested. It would be
4 7 Ohio Bell Tel. Co. v. Public Util. Comm'n, 301 U.S. 292 (1937).
48208 S.W.2d 593 (Tex. Civ. App. 1947), error ref. n.r.e.4
od. at 596.
50139 Tex. 80, 161 S.W.2d 1035 (1942).
[ Vol. 2 3
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placing a useless and intolerable burden on the Commission to require it to
make an 'appeal proof' record in every instance. The rights of the parties
will be fully protected if, upon a contest of the order in the district court,
the parties are given full opportunity to show that at the time the order was
entered there did, or did not, then exist sufficient facts to justify the entry
of the same."
The Texas courts are singularly unconcerned with the motives of ad-
ministrative agencies. Judicial inquiry is limited to the legal effect of the
administrative act upon the parties affected" and whether there is sub-
stantial evidence to support the decision."
V. STATUTORY REVIEW PROVISIONS
Substantial evidence de novo review is strictly by direction of Texas
courts, for it has never been prescribed by statute. Generally, review sta-
tutes are of five basic types." The first type provides for review by a "civil
suit." A good example is the statute providing for appeals from orders of
the Oil and Gas Division of the Railroad Commission.' The statute pro-
vides that, "[a]ny interested person affected by the conservation laws of
this State ... and who may be dissatisfied therewith, shall have the right
to file a suit in a court of competent jurisdiction in Travis County,
Texas.""0 It is further provided that the burden of proof shall be on the
complaining party and the order shall be deemed prima facie valid.
The second type of statute provides for review by "petition for cer-
tiorari. " Such a statute is article 101 I g,"s which governs proceedings for
review of the actions of local boards of adjustment. In Huley v. Board of
Adjustmente5 article 10 11 g was held to require application of substantial
evidence de novo review.
The third type of review statute provides for review by a "civil suit
explicitly based upon the substantial evidence rule." A statute of this kind
is article 4551 e,60 which authorizes appeals from decisions of the Texas
State Board of Dental Examiners suspending or revoking a dental hy-
gienist license."'
The fourth type of review statute provides that appeal will be by "trial
1 Id. at 81, 161 S.W.2d at 1036.
" Texas State Bd. of Examiners in Optometry v. Carp, 388 S.W.2d 409 (Tex. 1965).
"State Banking Bd. v. McCulloch, 316 S.W.2d 259 (Tex. Civ. App. 1958), error ref. n.r.e.
"'A classification of the review statutes into five basic types has been made in Roberts, Trial
of Administrative Appeals, 26 TEX. B.J. 731 (1963); Comment, judicial Review of Administrative
Agency Action-A Need for Texas Reform?, 40 TEXAs L. REX'. 992 (1962).
" TEX. REv. Csv. STAT. ANN. art. 6049c, § 8 (1962).
56 Id.
" For a discussion of the limited use of certiorari in Texas administrative appeals, see Comment,
The Methods and Nature of judicial Review of Orders of the Oil and Gas Division of the Railroad
Commission, 33 TEXAS L. REV. 680, 683 (1955).
5
TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 1011g (1963).
"'341 S.W.2d 212 (Tex. Civ. App. 1960).
"TEX. REV. Csv. STAT. ANN. art. 4551e (1960).
'"The statute provides: "If the Board shall make and enter any order revoking or suspending
any certificate or certificates . . . . the person or persons whose certificates shall have been so re-
voked or suspended may .. . take an appeal . ..by filing an appropriate petition for such purpose.
. . . Upon the hearing of such cause, all orders of the Board shall be valid if supported by sub-
stantial evidence .... " Id.
1969]
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de novo." This type of statute apparently was passed by the legislature
because of dislike of substantial evidence de novo review. However, the
legislature underestimated the affinity of the Texas courts for this
method of review. Fire Department v. City of Fort Worth involved
article 1269m a which established a civil service system for policemen and
firemen in cities of over 10,000 population. Section 18 of the statute pro-
vided that a fireman or policeman who was dissatisfied with a disciplinary
order could file a petition in the district court asking that his order of
suspension or dismissal be set aside. The statute provided that such a case
was to be tried de novo. In this case, the court of civil appeals held the
statute unconstitutional on the ground that it imposed upon the district
court administrative, as distinguished from judicial, functions. The su-
preme court reversed, holding that substantial evidence de novo review
was to be used. The court said:
The extent of such review has been rather generally held to be limited to
an ascertainment of whether there was substantial evidence reasonably suffic-
ient to support the challenged order .... There is nothing in Section 18 to
suggest that the district court is empowered to do more. Although the statute
provides for trial de novo, this term as applied to reviews of administrative
orders has come to have a well-defined significance in the decisions of this
state, and as a rule has been taken to mean a trial to determine only the issues
of whether the agency's ruling is free of the taint of any illegality and is
reasonably supported by substantial evidence."
Since the early 1950's the legislature has often enacted the fifth type of
statute, which provides for true de novo review as that "term is com-
monly used and intended in an appeal from the Justice Court to the
County Court." ' An appeal from justice to county court renders the
original judgment null and void for all purposes and a new trial is held at
which all issues are determined anew." One court has held that this type of
statute entitles the appellant to a trial de novo in its broadest sense. 7 By
62 147 Tex. 505, 217 S.W.2d 664 (1949).
"TEx. Ruv. CiV. STAT. ANN. art. 1269m (1963).
64147 Tex. at 510, 217 S.W.2d at 666. Jones v. Marsh, 148 Tex. 362, 224 S.W.2d 198 (1949),
involved an appeal from the denial of an application for a retail license to sell beer. The case was
appealed to district court under a statute providing that "The trial shall be de novo under the
same rules as ordinary civil suits." TEx. PEN. CODE ANN. art. 666-14 (1952). In holding that the
substantial evidence rule should apply, the court said:
[T]he statute does not expressly provide that there shall be in district court a full
retrial of the facts as if there had been no finding made by the county judge, nor
does the statute specify what issue or issues shall be tried in the district court. It may,
therefore, reasonably be concluded, in view of the subject matter involved and the
nature of the order to be reviewed, that only a limited review is intended, and that in
so far as the facts which are the basis for the order of the county judge are concerned
the question or issue to be determined in the district court is whether or not the
findings of the county judge are reasonably supported by substantial evidence. Such
a trial is one kind of a trial de novo, and the somewhat limited trial can be held, as
the statute requires, under the rules applicable to ordinary civil suits.
148 Tex. at 367, 224 S.W.2d at 201.
" This is the language used in TEx. REV. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 4506 (1966) which provides
for appeals from medical license revocations.
"Finfrock, Trial De Novo-Panacea?, 14 BAYLOR L. REV. 135 (1962); FitzGerald, Administra-
tive Law, Annual Survey of Texas Law, 21 Sw. L.J. 199 (1967); Roberts, The Trial of Ad-
ninistrative Appeals, 26 TEX. B.J. 731, 790 (1963).6 7Rockett v. State Bd. of Medical Examiners, 287 S.W.2d 190 (Tex. Civ. App. 1956), error
ref. n.r.e. See also Scott v. Board of Medical Examiners, 384 S.W.2d 686 (Tex. 1964).
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contrast, some of the statutes providing for such review on appeal from ad-
ministrative agencies have been held by the courts to run afoul of the
Texas Constitution. Article II, section 1" of the constitution precludes any
of the three branches of government from exercising powers properly be-
longing to another."' In Davis v. City of Lubbock"9 a property owner
sought to enjoin the city of Lubbock from condemning his property
pursuant to urban renewal law. The city had declared the area in which
his property was located as a slum area. A statute provided that in all
suits brought to review orders or decisions of a city or its agency, "the
trial shall be de novo as that term is used or understood in an appeal from
a Justice of the Peace Court to the County Court."" The statute pro-
vided further that: "It is the intent of the Legislature that such trial shall
be strictly de novo and that the decision in each such case shall be made in-
dependently of any action taken by the board, upon preponderance of the
evidence adduced at such trial and entirely free of the so-called 'substan-
tial evidence' rule enunciated by the courts in respect to orders of other
administrative or quasi-judicial agencies. ''
The Texas supreme court held the statute unconstitutional since it in-
vested the courts with authority to determine a legislative question. Hav-
ing struck down the de novo review provision, the court implied a right
to review and held that the substantial evidence rule should apply.
In Chemical Bank &¢ Trust Co. v. Falkner5 the supreme court held un-
constitutional article 342-115 of the Banking Code which provided that
"[t]he orders of the State Banking Board may be appealed to a court of
competent jurisdiction and the trial . . . shall be de novo the same as if
said matter had been originally filed in such court.""5 The court held that
a determination of public necessity for a new bank involves a determina-
tion of public policy which is a matter of legislative discretion and can-
not constitutionally be given to the judiciary."'
The fifty-seventh legislature proposed a constitutional amendment
which would authorize the legislature to provide for complete de novo
s TEx. CONST. art. II, S 1.
69 The powers of the government of the State of Texas shall be divided into three
distinct departments, each of which shall be confined to a separate body of magistry,
to wit: Those which are Legislative to one; those which are Executive to another;
and those which are Judicial to another; and no person, or collection of persons,
being of one of these departments, shall exercise any power properly attached to one
of the others, except in the instances herein expressly permitted.
Id.
70 160 Tex. 38, 326 S.W.2d 699 (Tex. 1959).
"Tex. Urban Renewal Act § 17, TEx. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 12691-3 (1957).
72 Id.
73 369 S.W.2d 427 (Tex. 1963).74 TEx. BANK. CoDE ANN. art. 342-115 (1959).
75 Id.
76Key Western Life Ins. v. State Bd. of Ins., 163 Tex. 11, 350 S.W.2d 839 (1961) involved
a direct appeal from a district court judgment upholding an order of the State Board of Insurance
withdrawing approval of a policy form used by the petitioner. Appeal was provided by TEx. INs.
CODE ANN. art. 21-44 (1963), which states that: "The action shall not be limited to questions
of law and the substantial evidence rule shall not apply, but such action shall be tried and de-
termined upon a trial de novo to the same extent as now provided for in the case of an appeal
from the Justice Court to the County Court." The court found article 21.44 to be constitutional
since the function under consideration was of a judicial nature and thus could be exercised by the
courts in a de novo proceeding.
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review of any administrative action." The amendment was soundly de-
feated by the voters, thus the validity of complete de novo review sta-
tutes will continue to turn on subtle distinctions between judicial and
legislative functions.
It is fortunate that the constitutional amendment was not passed. Com-
plete de novo review is no more desirable than substantial evidence de
novo review, and to imbed any error into the constitution renders it con-
siderably harder to correct. One of the primary justifications for the ex-
istence of administrative agencies is their expertise in complex and tech-
nical areas. If administrative orders are nullified when an appeal is filed,
the agency function is transferred to the courts; the agency becomes
merely a conduit through which controversies must pass in order to reach
the courts. In Southern Canal Co. v. State Board of Water Engineerstm
Justice Calvert indicated his reservations concerning trial de novo appeals
from decisions of the Board of Water Engineers. He wrote:
No doubt before enacting such a statutory provision the Legislature would
give careful consideration to some of its consequences-that decision of
technical matters would be removed from the hands of trained personnel and
lodged with the untrained; that an administrative agency of its own creation
would become a useless appendage; and that whereas on conflicting testimony
one judge or jury could and well might determine, for example, that there was
not sufficient unappropriated water to justify the granting of a permit, or
that the granting of the permit would be detrimental to the public welfare,
another judge or jury trying the right to a subsequent application, on the
same evidence, would determine that there was sufficient unappropriated water
to require the granting of the permit and the granting of it would not be
detrimental to the public welfare."
One writer has estimated that if all appeals from state agencies and
political subdivisions were de novo, 105,000 cases per year would be
added to the district court docket (purportedly a very conservative esti-
mate), an increase of almost two hundred per cent.'
VI. THE NEED FOR AN ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE ACT
Having failed to obtain true de novo review of administrative agencies,
the legislature should put mind to passage of an administrative procedure
act approximating the Model Act"' or the Federal Administrative Pro-
cedure Act."5 The first proposed administrative procedure act for Texas
was drafted by Professor Whitney R. Harris and published in the South-
western Law Journal."' The Administrative Law Committee of the State
1
7 Tex. H.J.R. 32, 57th Leg., Reg. Sess. (1961). See Comment, supra note 54.
78 159 Tex. 227, 318 S.W.2d 619 (1958). See J. WILSON, JUDICIAL REV.IEW OF DETERMINA-
TIONS OF THE BOARD OF WATER ENGINEERS, PROCEEDINGS--WATER LAW CONFERENCES 142
(Univ. of Texas 1959).
79 159 Tex. at 235, 318 S.W.2d at 625.
s°Comment, supra note 54, at 1012.
sI The Model State Administrative Procedure Act was approved by the National Conference of
Commissioners on Uniform State Laws in 1946. The Model Act was revised beginning in 1958.
The Revised Model State Administrative Procedure Act was adopted by the Conference of Comr
missioners in 1961. 2 F. COOPER, STATE ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 797 (1965).
82 Administrative Procedure Act of 1946, 5 U.S.C. §§ 1001-11 (1964).
8" Harris, An Administrative Procedure Act for Texas, 5 Sw. L.J. 125 (1951). See also Harris,
Administrative Procedure Act, 15 TEx. B.J. 7 (1952).
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Bar of Texas was created "to study and report on administrative law,
procedure and practice, to the end that the operating processes and pro-
cedure of the administrative boards and agencies of the State may be
standardized and made certain, and that adequate safeguards and controls
be established and maintained to insure due regard for constitutional
guarantees in the exercise of administrative action and discretion.""4 The
committee drafted a proposed act that was approved by a referendum of
the bar in February 1953 but was not submitted to the legislature."' In
1957 the committee abandoned an administrative procedure act and ap-
proved a measure that would require the various agencies to file their
rules of procedure."6 Such an act was passed by the legislature in 1961.'
The committee is currently in the process of drafting another administra-
tive procedure act. However, passage of such an act does not seem prob-
able at this time. It is to be expected that some of the agencies would be
opposed to the far-ranging changes effected by such an act. It is also
likely that some administrative lawyers, adept at furthering their clients'
interests through the current system, would be hesitant to make changes.'
However, the Rules of Civil Procedure were passed in the face of similar
opposition and an administrative procedure act is no less desirable or nec-
essary than the Rules. Ultimate passage of such an act will depend upon
the concern and commitment of the bar.
Among the main reasons for the passage of administrative procedure
acts by many states are clarification and standardization of the admin-
istrative system and its procedures. Though this in itself is compelling
reason to pass such an act, existence of substantial evidence de novo re-
view in Texas has made necessary three basic changes which are more
important.
First, a complete record should be made before the administrative
agency. The Railroad Commission Order in Alamo Express Inc. v. Rail-
road Commission"' states at the outset of each paragraph of the findings:
"The Commission further finds from the evidence and its own records
.... " If the agency possesses all of the expertise claimed for it, it should
be able to place supporting exhibits and testimony into its record. There
is surely no way the court will ever know whether such evidence was
weighed by the agency, and it is only elemental fairness that a party know
what evidence is being considered contrary to his position. The Federal
Administrative Procedure Act provides that:
The transcript of testimony and exhibits, together with all papers and re-
quests filed in the proceeding, shall constitute the exclusive record for decision
in accordance with section 1007 of this title and, upon payment of lawfully
prescribed costs, shall be made available to the parties. Where any agency
decision rests on official notice of a material fact not appearing in the evi-
8
4 Statement of Committee on Committees, 13 TEx. B.J. 257 (1950).
" 16 TEX. B.J. 391 (1953).
"Werkenthin, Administrative Procedure Act Needed, 24 TEx. B.J. 213 (1961).
'
7 Tx. REv. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 6252-13 (1962).
88 See Patterson, Procedure Act Opposed, 16 TEx. B.J. 377 (1953), for an example of outraged
opposition.
"9407 S.W.2d 479, 481 (Tex. 1966) (emphasis added).
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dence in the record, any party shall on timely request be afforded an oppor-
tunity to show the contrary.'0
Secondly, the agency should state the reasons and the findings necessary
to support its action. 1 I believe this is an essential part of the decision
making process. Prior to the passage of the Federal Administrative Pro-
cedure Act, the federal courts often were concerned with the lack or
insufficiency of administrative findings. 2 In 1935 in Panama Refining Co.
v. Ryan" the United States Supreme Court indicated that the lack of
findings in support of an administrative order violated due process. In
subsequent cases, however, the Court based such a requirement on statu-
tory or other non-constitutional grounds.
In Texas several statutes require specific fact findings to be made."'
Though no findings are required by the Oil and Gas Division of the Rail-
road Commission, findings are required by the Motor Transportation Di-
vision of that Commission, and the courts have enforced the require-
ment." In Miller v. Railroad Commission" the Texas supreme court was
confronted with findings of the Motor Transportation Division that were
pre-printed with blanks to be filled in with the names of the parties,
dates, etc. The court held that the findings were not supported by sub-
stantial evidence. In a concurring opinion, Judge Greenhill said:
In passing upon an application of this character, the Commission is acting
in a quasi-judicial capacity. After the Commission rules, its findings are
presumed to be valid; and the losing party must bear the heavy burden of
overcoming its findings under the substantial evidence rule. For the Com-
mission to print in advance and use forms containing its fact findings upon
which the order is based, filling in the date, the names of the parties and the
authority granted, in a contested case, is itself, in my opinion, a lack of
procedural due process of law."
"aAdministrative Procedure Act S 7(d), 5 U.S.C. § 1006(d) (1964).
" See McGinnis & Temple, Administrative Agencies Should Tell Us Why, 24 Tax. B.J. 211
(1961).
"See 2 K. DAvis, supra note 22, § 16.04; Comment, supra note 18, at 651. Some state courts
have held that due process requires administrative agencies to make findings. See, e.g., Swars v.
Council of City of Vallejo, 33 Cal. 2d 867, 206 P.2d 355 (1949); Laney v. Holbrook, 150 Fla.
622, 8 So. 2d 465 (1942); Appalachian Power Co. v. Commonwealth, 132 Va. 1, 110 S.E. 360
(1922).
"'293 U.S. 388 (1935).
94See Comment, supra note 18, at 651.
" See, e.g., TEx. Rav. Civ. STAr. ANN. art. 1269m, § 16 (1963), which provides for suspension
of civil service employees. The statute provides that "[njo employee shall be suspended or dismissed
by the Commission except for violation of the civil service rules, and except upon a finding by the
Commission of the truth of the specific charges against such employee." See City of Houston v.
Melton, 163 Tex. 294, 354 S.W.2d 387 (1962), where the supreme court held that the following
statement constituted sufficient findings under the statute: "[A]nd the evidence as a whole leaves
no doubt in our minds as to the substance . . . of the issues. Based on such evidence, as well as
upon the appearance and demeanor of the witnesses while testifying, we have no doubt that
[respondent] was guilty of improper and wrongful conduct, well within said Specifications remaining
before us. ... Id. at 297, 354 S.W.2d at 389. In a dissenting opinion, Justice Walker said: "The
order states only that respondent was 'guilty of improper and wrongful conduct, well within the
specifications remaining before us.' This falls somewhat short of a finding that he had committed
each and all of the six alleged acts of misconduct." Id. at 299, 354 S.W.2d at 391.
"The statute provides that, "in any contested hearing, the Commission shall, along with its
order, file a concise written opinion setting forth the facts and grounds for its action, and such
opinion shall be admissible as evidence on any appeal. TEx. REv. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 911 (b),
5 12(a) (1964).
"' 363 S.W.2d 244 (Tex. 1962).
"8 Concurring opinion, id. at 247.
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Professor Davis has observed that, "[t]he practical reasons for requir-
ing administrative findings are so powerful that the requirement has been
imposed with remarkable uniformity by virtually all federal and state
courts, irrespective of a statutory requirement.""" Davis believes the most
important reason for findings to be the facilitation of judicial review.
Overlooking Texas administrative law, he has said that, "[i]f there were
no law requiring findings, judges struggling with masses of evidence and
hazy findings, trying their best to discover whether the agency has ap-
plied the proper principles, would surely invent such a requirement."'"
A further reason for findings is to inform a losing party as to why an
agency decided a controversy in the manner it did. Without such know-
ledge, it is difficult to know whether to appeal, or upon which ground to
base an appeal. If the factual basis for an unfavorable decision is un-
known, a losing party may not know what change of conditions would
result in a subsequent favorable determination. Further, it would seem
that the process of formulating findings would help assure that an admin-
istrator understands the evidence and the issues of a case, thus preventing
arbitrary or careless decisions.
The third basic change needed, as has been emphasized, is restriction of
review to the record made in the administrative agency."° ' For years we
were concerned as to whether this procedure would be constitutional in
Texas, largely because of some statements made by Chief Justice Alex-
ander in the early cases.' 2 In Gerst v. Nixon,'° however, the supreme court
had no difficulty in upholding the constitutionality of the new Savings
and Loan Act' in this respect. As originally passed, the review provisions
of the Texas Savings & Loan Act provided for a method of review dif-
ferent from either the Federal APA or the usual form of Texas substan-
tial evidence review. The Act provided that upon review of any order or
decision of the Commissioner (except removal orders), the court is to
re-try fact issues and resolve them by applying the preponderance of the
evidence standard. However, no evidence shall be admissible which was
not adduced at the hearing on the matter before the Commissioner or
officially noticed in the record of such hearing.'3 In Nixon the supreme
go2 K. DAVIS, supra note 22, § 16.05, at 444.
'
00 1d. § 16.05, at 445.
''REVISED MODEL STATE ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE ACT § 15(f) (1961) provides that,
"The review shall be conducted by the court without a jury and shall be confined to the record.
In cases of alleged irregularities in procedure before the agency, not shown in the record, proof
thereon may be taken in the court. The court, upon request, shall hear oral argument and receive
written briefs."
102 See, e.g., Railroad Comm'n v. Shell Oil Co., 139 Tex. 66, 72, 161 S.W.2d 1022, 1028 (1942).
103 411 S.W.2d 350 (Tex. 1966). See Fitzgerald, Administrative Law, Annual Survey of Texas
Law, 22 Sw. L.J. 223, 226 (1968); Fitzgerald, Administrative Law, Annual Survey of Texas Law,
21 Sw. L.J. 199, 214 (1967).
"
54 TEx. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 852a (1964).
'0 The review of any other act, order, ruling or decision of the Commissioner or of
any rule or regulation shall be tried by the court without a jury in the same manner
as civil actions generally and all fact issues material to the validity of the Act, order,
ruling, decision or rule or regulation complained of shall be redetermined in such
trial on the preponderance of the competent evidence, but no evidence shall be ad-
missible which was not adduced at the hearing on the matter before the Commissioner
or officially noticed in the record of such hearing.
TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 852a, § 11.12(5)(b) (1964).
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court struck down the de novo provisions of the Act as violative of the
separation of powers requirement of the Texas Constitution." However,
the court upheld the requirement that review be limited to evidence con-
tained in the administrative record. Thus, judicial modification of a hy-
brid form of review has resulted in Texas' closest approximation to fed-
eral type review."'
Restriction of review to the agency record increases the desirability of
more formal hearing procedure, and some procedural safeguards have
been provided by the Commissioner.08 He has issued regulations stating
that all witnesses offering testimony at a hearing must be under oath and
that a reporter must record the testimony.
The recent case of Gerst v. Gibraltar Savings & Loan Ass'n'" presented
another question yet to be resolved by the courts. The Commissioner had
denied Gibraltar's application for a Houston branch office on the basis of
three unfavorable findings. The Commissioner refused to consider an
affidavit by one Dr. Yeager attesting to the public need for a new branch
office. The affidavit, though hearsay, was part of the administrative rec-
ord. The district court reversed and remanded, holding that there was no
substantial evidence supporting the Commissioner's action. The court of
civil appeals reversed, holding that the Commissioner acted properly in
not considering the ex parte affidavit. The court further held that the
court on appeal could not consider testimony given at the trial by Dr.
Yeager. The court of civil appeals remanded the case to the Commissioner.
The supreme court refused the application, no reversible error, but ex-
pressly refrained from deciding whether the court of civil appeals was
correct in remanding the case to the Commissioner.
The question suggested by Gibraltar is whether all evidence that would
be inadmissible in a judicial trial should be excluded from an administra-
tive record. The federal rule and the majority rule in the state courts is
that evidence can be considered, though inadmissible in a judicial trial, if
it appears to be sufficiently trustworthy to be relied on in the ordinary
conduct of serious business affairs, provided there is other competent evi-
dence looking in the same direction.1 0
When the problems presented by the Savings & Loan Act have been
worked out by the courts, Texas will have an example of judicial review
much superior to our traditional substantial evidence de novo review. We
may hope that such a beginning will lead to legislative adoption of an
'05 The rest of the paragraph was saved by the statute's severance clause. The text of TEX.
CONST. art. *1, § I is set out in note 69 supra.
107 On motion for rehearing in Nixon, it was asserted that the statutory and rules provision
governing hearings before the Commissioner were defective for lack of power to issue subpoenas
and take depositions. The court refused to rule on this question, stating that: "There is no showing
that the lack of witness attendance or discovery procedures, if any there be, operated to the preju-
dice of said protesting association. . . . The present record does not present a question of pro-
cedural due process and we decline to rule on a purely hypothetical case." 411 S.W.2d at 360-61.
For a general discussion of administrative subpoena power, see Benton, Administrative Subpoena En-
forcement, 41 TEXAS L. REv. 874 (1963).
10" See Comment, Statutory Control of the Texas Savings and Loan Industry, 44 TEXAS L. REV.
966, 971 (1966).
'0'413 S.W.2d 718 (Tex. Civ. App.), aff'd per curtain, 417 S.W.2d 584 (Tex. 1967).
"o 2 K. DAvIs, supra note 22, § 14.06.
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administrative procedure act for Texas. Meanwhile, I suggest that the
courts immediately drop the bar to admissibility of the administrative
record and evidence of those proceedings in order that an appealing party
may undertake to show that his cause was treated arbitrarily.
